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Is there a connection between lynchings andrecent attempts to impose the death penalty?
Many studies have analyzed individual trial
court decisions to discover whether racial dis-
crimination influences the likelihood of a death
sentence. After holding legal effects constant,
such as the severity of the crime and the offend-
er’s prior convictions, these studies have used
offender race to explain death sentences. Despite
strong suspicions that the death penalty is not
administered in a color-blind fashion, findings
about offender race have been inconsistent (see
Dodge et al. 1990 and Paternoster 1991 for
reviews). These studies, however, may be incon-
clusive because they ignore the remarkable his-
tory of race relations in the United States.
In comparison to other nations, U.S. race
relations have been exceptionally antagonistic
and violent (Myrdal 1944; Tocqueville [1935]
1948). After African American slaves were freed
by a brutal Civil War, white citizens sought to
maintain the prior racial caste system with ille-
gal violence directed largely against ex-slaves.
From 1882 to 1951, more than 4,600 persons
were lynched (Tolnay and Beck 1996). Although
most of these acts took place in the South from
1882 to 1930, many occurred in other regions
during this period. In the Jim Crow South, a set
of social and legal codes enforced by legal coer-
cion and vigilantism ensured the separation of
the races and almost complete black subjugation
(Wacquant 2000). Many scholars have claimed
that the current death penalty is a partial replace-
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Capital punishment is the most severe punishment, yet little is known about the social
conditions that lead to death sentences. Racial threat explanations imply that this
sanction will be imposed more often in jurisdictions with larger minority populations,
but some scholars suggest that a tradition of vigilante violence leads to increased death
sentences. This study tests the combined explanatory power of both accounts by
assessing statistical interactions between past lynchings and the recent percentage of
African Americans after political conditions and other plausible effects are held
constant. Findings from count models based on different samples, data, and estimators
suggest that racial threat and lynchings combine to produce increased death sentences,
but the presence of liberal political values explains the absence of death sentences. These
findings both confirm and refine the political version of conflict theory because they
suggest that the effects of current racial threat and past vigilantism largely directed
against newly freed slaves jointly contribute to current lethal but legal reactions to racial
threat.
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ment for vigilantism used in the past to main-
tain this caste system (Bowers 1984; Dollard
1957; Marable 2000; Phillips 1987). This claim
seems plausible because the states that once
had the highest lynching rates now appear to use
the death sentence most often (Zimring 2003).
Yet despite the extraordinary nature of this vio-
lence, the effects of lynchings have been infre-
quently investigated.
In this study we attempt to fill this gap by
focusing on whether the vigilantism used pri-
marily to control ex-slaves created an enduring
repressive tradition that continues to produce
additional death sentences where lynchings had
been most common. Theoretical accounts sug-
gest that such explanations should matter. Stone
(1987) claimed that the death penalty was used
by powerful groups to protect their privileges
with selective terror. Garland (1990) argued
that criminal punishment is shaped not only by
the amount or severity of crime, but also by
perceptions about the menace of “problem pop-
ulations.” According to conflict theorists, an
important, but not the only, use of the law is to
control underclass populations who pose a threat
to the current unequal social order. If criminal
punishments are shaped partly by the menace of
a racial underclass whose members have much
to gain from violence used to take goods from
the privileged, a harsh punishment such as the
death sentence should be more likely where
such threats are most severe.
We analyze recent death sentences to dis-
cover whether the vigilantism directed largely
against blacks in the past and current racial
threats to white dominance attributable to larg-
er black populations operate together to produce
additional death sentences. Evidence for such
a combined relationship between prior vigilan-
tism and recent minority threat would support
claims that the death sentence is currently
imposed partly because it is a legal and there-
fore more acceptable replacement for lynch-
ings. These considerations suggest that death
sentences should be especially likely in states
with the largest minority populations that also
had a history of frequent vigilante violence.
In light of the intense interest in the death
penalty and the controversies about whether
this punishment is administered impartially, it
is surprising that we know so little about the
influence of race and the other social condi-
tions that make some jurisdictions far more
likely to impose this sentence than others. We
begin to fill this gap in the literature by using
pooled time-series, cross-sectional count mod-
els that capture both jurisdictional differences
in this outcome and shifts in the number of
death sentences over time.1 We study death sen-
tences rather than executions for important
methodological reasons (see note 6), but also
because the initial decisions to begin the death
penalty process by prosecutors and trial courts
are so important. Because single-factor expla-
nations are suspect, we assess many hypotheses,
but this means the next section cannot deal with
the theoretical justifications for only a few
explanations.
THEORY
We expect that the historical residue of the ran-
corous and violent conflicts about slavery still
influences the ultimate criminal punishment.
To address this issue, we assess the combined
ability of lynchings and current black threat to
explain recent death sentences. In additional
analyses, we discover whether this joint effect
explains African American death sentences and
whether this effect accounts for these sentences
in 10 southern states. We begin by discussing
lynchings and the reasons why this historical
violence should continue to influence recent
death sentences. We next spell out the theoret-
ical grounds for expecting a connection between
racial threat and criminal punishment. The last
part of this section presents the reasons for
thinking that other effects should be held con-
stant in the analyses.
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1 In 1972 in Furman the Supreme Court ruled that
the death penalty was unconstitutional. In 1976, in
Gregg the Court reversed and upheld the constitu-
tionality of guided discretionary statutes combined
with a separate sentencing procedure. To achieve
cross trial court sentencing equity the Court required
standardized instructions to juries listing aggravating
or mitigating factors to be considered in the separate
penalty hearing (Paternoster 1991). Most death penal-
ty states then altered their statutes to meet these new
requirements. We include period controls to capture
shifts in death sentences attributable to these decisions
and other unmeasured historical events that might
influence the results.
MINORITY THREAT, VIGILANTISM, 
AND DEATH SENTENCES
LETHAL VIGILANTISM. A common dominant
group reaction to the threat to their ascendance
posed by larger minority populations involves
extralegal violence. The lynching of ex-slaves
that occurred after Reconstruction is an excel-
lent example (Tolnay and Beck 1996). Black
(1976) has argued that because they are used for
the same ends, illegal and legal social control
methods are at least partly interchangeable.
Phillips (1987:365), quoting Turk (1982:351),
claimed that “both off icial and unoff icial
killings constitute ‘behavior intended to estab-
lish and maintain an unequally beneficial rela-
tionship.’” According to many scholars, whites
often used lynchings to control ex-slaves and to
ensure that they did not forget their subordinate
place in a racial caste system (Ayers 1984;
Dollard 1957; Tolnay and Beck 1996). Yet
although many historians (particularly Ayers
1984; Brown 1969; and Woodward 1966) and
some sociologists (Corzine, Corzine, and Creech
1988; Corzine, Creech, and Corzine 1983;
Olzak 1990; Reed 1972; Soule 1992; Tolnay and
Beck 1996) have assessed the determinants of
lynchings, few have studied the legal conse-
quences of this mass violence.
Whites in the Jim Crow South clearly viewed
lynching as a replacement for capital punish-
ment (Dollard 1957; Phillips 1987; Tolnay and
Beck 1996). Dollard captured this comple-
mentary relationship between legal and extrale-
gal violence by writing: “the crux of the matter
is white control of formal force, the police,
sheriffs, justices of the peace, judges, and juries
.|.|. [but] extralegal force supplements and sup-
ports these legal actions” (p. 333). Equivalent
claims were made by lynch mobs. In a con-
temporary apology for lynchings, Collins
(1918:57) quoted a resolution by a lynch mob
that “in the event of a trial (the offender) shall
be hanged.” These vigilantes went on to justify
their act with the claim that a trial would be a
sham because “there is no moral difference in
the means of destroying him.” Phillips gave
another example when he discussed a temporary
increase in lynchings that occurred in Colorado
after capital punishment briefly became ille-
gal. Contemporary newspaper accounts attrib-
uted this increase in illegal violence to the
elimination of capital punishment as a legal
alternative to lynchings. If these claims about the
interchangeability of legal and extralegal reac-
tions to racial threat in the past are correct, a tra-
dition of lethal vigilantism may still help
produce recent death sentences because the
death penalty now may be used partly as a legal
replacement for this vigilante violence.
We therefore suggest that the vigilantism
largely intended to ensure that newly freed
blacks reverted to their prior subordinate status
had enduring effects on another lethal punish-
ment. Assertions about the historical force of
such lengthy causal chains based on the power
of tradition are hardly novel. Durkheim “lament-
ed that many social facts ‘continue to exist
merely through force of habit’among them anti-
quated penal .|.|. institutions .|.|. ‘that time has
f ixed and organized in us’” (Camic
1986:1051–52 quoting Durkheim [1895]. 1982;
see also Ogburn 1937 for additional discus-
sions of cultural lag).2
The aberrant nature of this repeated violence,
which went so far beyond even the accepted
standards of the day (Tolnay and Beck 1996),
shows the intensity of this mass commitment to
racial domination. Wacquant (2000) used the
enduring effects of concepts such as social
impurity and taboo put forward by Douglas
(1966) to help explain this persistence. Jim
Crow and the lynchings that supported this
regime maintained the “symbolic distance need-
ed to prevent the odium of ‘amalgamation’with
a group considered inferior, rootless, and vile”
(p. 380).
After the Civil Rights era “while whites
begrudgingly accepted integration in principle,
in practice they strove to maintain an unbridge-
able social and symbolic gulf with their com-
patriots of African American descent. They
abandoned public schools, shunned public
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2 Future power holders tend to have the same val-
ues as past power holders, so power in subsequent
generations will work in the same direction as cur-
rent institutions. “If power this year is used to com-
mit the population to a value, the population itself in
socializing its successors will preserve the value.
And if activities of a society embody the value, any
functions of these activities for other values and
interests or any inertia in activities as such will tend
to preserve patterns related to the value in the next
generation. All three processes create infinite self-
replicating loops” (Stinchcombe 1987:108).
space, fled to the suburbs in millions to avoid
mixing, .|.|. [and] they extended enthusiastic
support for law and order policies” that helped
to enforce these racial boundaries (p. 382). One
implication is that where these enduring racial
taboos had been most intensely enforced by
illicit violence, the use of legal violence now can
be expected to achieve the same ends.
The fervor that evoked this fierce repression
suggests that violence used to ensure black sub-
ordination would endure in one form or anoth-
er. But the unacceptability of vigilantism,
particularly after the violent efforts to repress the
Civil Rights movement that awakened the
national conscience and destroyed Jim Crow,
meant that this repression would have to take a
different, more acceptable form. This fierce
passion for violent control in the past never-
theless enhances the plausibility of claims that
the harsh methods used to maintain the domi-
nance of whites over blacks persist in sufficient
strength to influence recent legal decisions about
death sentences. “What distinguishes the saga
of lynchings in the United States from other
examples of mob violence in Western history are
the volume of killings, the length of the period
lynching was practiced .|.|. , and its linkage to
racial repression.|.|.|. It is the lynching tradition
as a historical institution that seems to have a
lasting influence on capital punishment”
(Zimring 2003:90). It follows that acts based on
such passions and notions of racial impurity
are likely to persist over long periods in contrast
to behavior not based on such primordial sen-
timents.
Zimring (2003) went on to show how this
local violence helped erode inhibitions about a
legal death penalty. “The critical significance of
a vigilante tradition .|.|. is that it neutralizes a
powerful argument against allowing the state to
kill its enemies: the fear of government power”
(p. 98). Such a tradition that regards the pun-
ishment of criminals as a local concern removes
a major claim against a state-managed death
penalty. “The citizen who has positive feelings
about vigilante violence will identify more
closely with the punishment process, [and] will
think of punishment as a community activity”
rather than as an act by a distrusted govern-
ment separate from the community (p. 99).
Vigilante customs thus reduced the public’s nor-
mal distrust of the institution that administers
the death penalty. Yet the main point is that the
fierce mass passions based on taboos about
racial impurity that had provided a foundation
for this now unacceptable vigilantism could be
expressed with a legal, and therefore far more
acceptable, death penalty.
Despite its plausibility, apparently only
Phillips (1987), Tolnay and Beck (1996), and
Zimring (2003) have examined the relationship
between lynching and capital punishment.3
Phillips’ (1987) study of the links between
lynchings and executions in North Carolina
from 1889 to 1918 does not reveal consistent
patterns, perhaps because he limited his analy-
sis to correlations. Tolnay and Beck (1996) ten-
tatively concluded that no association existed
between these two forms of control in 10 south-
ern states in the late 19th century, but they did
not report tests for statistical interaction.
Zimring (2003) claimed that a relationship exists
between past lynchings and recent executions in
all states, but he analyzed this association with
bivariate cross-tabulations. In the light of
Zimring’s intriguing but less than authoritative
results, and because current legal and past illic-
it killings may be used for the same repressive
ends (Phillips 1987; Turk 1982), we expect the
number of death sentences to be greater in
states with a history of multiple lynchings
because this tradition should still produce
greater pressures on court officials and juries
to impose the death penalty.
RACIAL THREAT. The threat of larger minori-
ty populations also should matter (Blumer 1958;
Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Prejudice is greater
where black presence is more substantial
(Quillian 1995, 1996; Taylor 1998). With crime
–
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3 Zimring’s (2003) theoretical stance on the con-
ceptual links between lynchings and the current use
of the death penalty differs somewhat from ours. We
suspect that this relationship between lynchings and
recent death sentences depends on the presence of
African American populations that are substantial
enough to pose a threat to dominant whites. We
emphasize an interactive relationship between a tra-
dition of racially repressive vigilantism, the current
menace of large black populations, and capital pun-
ishment. Yet Zimring assumed that the relationship
between lynchings and the death penalty is additive
because this relationship does not depend on addi-
tional explanatory factors.
rates controlled, Liska, Lawrence, and
Sanchirico (1982) and Quillian and Pager (2002)
found that black presence leads to enhanced
fear of crime. Larger black populations pro-
duce increased votes for anti-minority candi-
dates (Giles and Buckner 1993; Giles and Hertz
1994), who often support harsh punishments. A
legal death penalty is likely in states with the
most black residents (Jacobs and Carmichael
2002). Findings that public support for capital
punishment is associated with black presence
and racial prejudice (Barkan and Cohn 1994;
Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003) also suggest
that the number of death sentences will be
greater in states with more blacks. In some
states, Hispanics are the largest minority, so
death sentences should be more frequent where
Hispanic populations are largest.
This relationship may not be linear (Blalock
1967). Theory suggests that whites will make
greater demands for punitive measures after
expansions in black presence. Yet when such
minority populations reach a threshold and their
political influence becomes sufficient, the pos-
itive relationship between minority presence
and punitive responses should become nega-
tive (Jackson and Carroll 1981). Further growth
in black presence past this threshold should
give this minority enough political influence to
reduce death sentences. Hence, the relation-
ship between the percentage of blacks and death
sentences should be positive, but where the
black population has reached a threshold, this
relationship should become negative. Blacks
need not reach majority status for this reversal
to occur. Minorities instead need only expand
to the point at which their votes can decide
elections in jurisdictions where other voting
blocs are evenly matched.
AN INTERACTIVE HYPOTHESIS. The links
between these events, however, may be more
complex. Historical outcomes can be contingent
on the joint appearance of more than one set of
conditions that must be present in sufficient
strength. In the absence of a black population
sufficiently large to pose a current threat, a
prior tradition of vigilantism may not be enough
to lead to additional death sentences. And with-
out a history of frequent lynchings and a con-
comitant tradition that justified this exceptional
mass violence, the threat posed by the current
presence of a substantial African American pop-
ulation may not be suff icient to produce
increased death sentences. Repeated findings
(Tolnay and Beck 1996) that lynchings were a
reaction to the threat based on larger black pop-
ulations enhance the plausibility of one link in
this interactive account because such results
suggest that larger black populations still may
lead to lethal control methods.
Inclinations to use deadly force to sustain
unequal relationships (Turk 1982) either can
take the form of extralegal vigilantism or these
proclivities can be expressed with legal sanc-
tions that now may be partly used for the same
repressive ends (Black 1976; Dollard 1957;
Marable 2000; Phillips 1987). Claims about the
interchangeability of lynchings and current
death sentences rest on the presence of a well-
documented (Dollard 1957; Zimring 2003)
repressive tradition that continues to make lethal
reactions to racial threat acceptable to many
citizens via the means described by
Stinchcombe (1987), Wacquant (2000), and
Zimring (2003). But the blatantly inequitable
laws and vigilantism used in the Jim Crow era
have become indefensible. A more acceptable
alternative is to carry out lethal repression under
the cloak of law. Because it is imposed by an
ostensibly objective legal process, the death
penalty provides an acceptable way to contin-
ue the use of lethal sanctions to control “prob-
lem populations.” This replacement hypothesis
leads to an expectation that an interactive rela-
tionship should be present because death sen-
tences should be most common in states that
currently have larger proportions of African
Americans combined with a history of repeat-
ed lynchings.
Although it is not as probable, perhaps both
black and white offenders were more likely to
face the death sentence where lynchings had
been most common because many whites were
lynched even in the South (Tolnay and Beck
1996:270). Discrimination in the process that
leads to death sentences is likely, but it is not
overt. Literature reviews (Dodge et al. 1990;
Paternoster 1991) conclude that the effects of
offender race are not clear-cut. A black who
kills a white is far more likely to be sentenced
to death, but this racial pattern occurs in only
about 3 percent of all murders. These consid-
erations are consistent with a finding that the
percentage of blacks on death row is propor-
tional to the percentage of murders they com-
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mit (Blume, Eisenberg, and Wells 2004). It is
plausible that overt and therefore indisputable
discrimination in the death sentencing process
would place the constitutionality of this pun-
ishment at risk. Perhaps a vigilante tradition
may produce additional death sentences for all
races (Zimring 2003) although the threat of this
sanction is designed primarily to control under-
class blacks. We expect that the racial accounts
we test should nevertheless have greater
explanatory power when black death sentences
are at issue. But prudence and the informative
contrasts that may appear suggest that we dis-
cover whether this interactive account explains
all death sentences as well as those death sen-
tences given only to blacks.
These interactive and nonlinear threat rela-
tionships between African American presence,
lynching rates, and death sentences lead to an
additional prediction based on conflict and racial
threat theory. Where lynching rates were excep-
tionally high, we can expect that far larger
African American proportions will be necessary
before the number of death sentences start to
decline. Increases in African American politi-
cal influence should be obstructed in these states
with high lynching rates partly because larger
black populations should be more threatening
to whites, who probably will take additional
steps to resist black political influence in such
jurisdictions.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
FOR DEATH SENTENCES
The United States is an exceptionally direct
democracy, so voters decide policies that are
controlled by unelected officials elsewhere
(Savelsberg 1994). Such arrangements enhance
the effects of public values, particularly when
an intensely moral outcome such as the death
sentence is decided (Windlesham 1998). The
judicial politics literature suggests that public
opinion influences the courts (Carp and Stidham
1996; Hughes 1995) in part because all prose-
cutors and most trial court judges are elected.
Because political and religious ideologies and
partisanship affect death sentences (Jacobs and
Carmichael 2004), these accounts should be
examined as well.
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY. Conservatives view
criminals as responsible for their acts. If “crime
is a decision, not a disease” (John Major, quot-
ed by Garland 2001), increases in the expected
costs of such acts should be effective, so con-
servatives often believe that deterrence is the
best antidote for crime. Conservatives use such
rationales to justify dubious claims that the
threat of the death chamber will save many
innocent victims from criminal violence.4 But
liberals believe that crime is caused by
inequitable conditions (Garland 2001), so they
are skeptical about harsh sanctions (Brillon
1988; Langworthy and Whitehead 1986).
Capital punishment is likely to be legal in the
most conservative states (Jacobs and Carmichael
2002). Hence, we expect more death sentences
where conservative values dominate.
FUNDAMENTALISM. Religious conservatives
stress retribution for crime. Historical studies
show that religious views have helped to shape
criminal punishments (Erikson 1966; Savelsberg
2004). Attitudinal results show that fundamen-
talist values are associated with enhanced sup-
port for severe criminal measures (Grasmick and
McGill 1994; Grasmick et al. 1992). Where
fundamentalism is strongest, prosecutors should
be more likely to ask for the death penalty, and
judges and juries should be sympathetic. Hence,
death sentence frequencies should be greater in
states with the most fundamentalist church mem-
berships. Religion, of course, can affect attitudes
without altering legal decisions (Jacobs and
Carmichael 2002), so this hypothesis should
be tested.
JUDICIAL SELECTION. Death sentences should
be more likely where judges must face the vot-
ers. Lenient judges who ignore the substantial
public support for capital punishment and block
death sentences should be particularly vulner-
able in states that use partisan judge elections
(Brace and Hall 1997; Bright and Keenan 1995).
Although Blume and Eisenberg (1999) found no
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4 Careful reviews of the multiple empirical stud-
ies on this issue conducted by legal scholars (Zimring
and Hawkins 1986), a criminologist (Paternoster
1991), sociologists (Bailey and Peterson 1999), and
an economist (Levitt 2002) conclude that the death
penalty has no discernable general deterrent effects
beyond those conferred by long prison terms.
evidence that judicial elections produce added
death sentences, Hall (1992) reported that appel-
late justices were less likely to rule against death
penalty verdicts in states with short judicial
election terms. Huber and Gordon (2004)
reported that felony sentences became more
severe as a judge’s time to his or her next elec-
tion diminished. Partisan elections inhibit judi-
cial independence (Hanssen 2004), so death
sentences should be more common if judges
face partisan elections.
PARTISANSHIP. Criminal punishment is inher-
ently political. In contrast to rivals to their left,
findings show that conservative parties support
harsh punishments (Jacobs and Carmichael
2001; Stucky, Heimer, and Lang 2005; Sutton
2000). Law and order campaign appeals have
helped Republicans win elections (Edsal and
Edsal 1991). Capital punishment is likely to be
legal where Republican strength is greatest
(Jacobs and Carmichael 2002), and more death
sentences occur in such states (Jacobs and
Carmichael 2004). Hence, death sentences
should be increasingly likely in states with a
Republican governor because of the sensitizing
effects of Republican rhetoric (Beckett 1997),
and because the success of such law and order
candidates indicates greater support for harsh
punishments.
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS. Research on legal
punishment has focused on the neo-Marxist
hypothesis that punishment is used to control the
excess supply of labor in capitalist societies
(Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939). Many studies
have assessed the link between unemployment
and incarceration, but the results have been
inconsistent. One review has shown that only
about 60 percent of the 147 associations between
unemployment and imprisonments were sig-
nificant and positive (Chiricos and Delone
1992). Despite such mixed findings, we expect
that high joblessness rates will increase death
sentences because the prosperous may view the
unemployed as a threat to the social order
(Chambliss 1964), or because substantial unem-
ployment produces greater resentments against
street criminals and magnifies demands for
severe punishments.
Violent crime rates must be held constant
because death sentences should be frequent in
jurisdictions that experience more of these
crimes. Rankin (1979) detected a positive rela-
tionship between violent crime rates and support
for the death penalty. Jurisdictions with the
highest violent crime rates therefore should be
more likely to use the death sentence after the
number of capital crimes has been held constant.
High property crime rates also may enhance
perceptions of threat and produce successful
public demands for more death sentences. In the
statistical analyses, we control for each of these
potential influences, but our primary focus is on
the combined relationship between prior lynch-
ings, current racial threat, and death sentences.
METHODS
RESEARCH DESIGN, THE DEPENDENT
VARIABLE, AND ESTIMATION
Death sentences are unusual, so apparently no
existing offender level court data sets provide
the information required for a statistical study
of this sentence.5 The factors that produce death
sentences must be assessed with an analysis of
state counts. This unit of analysis is appropri-
ate because state governments help to deter-
mine death sentence frequencies in important
ways. These governments specify the number of
jurors and hence the difficulties prosecutors
face when they must obtain unanimous ver-
dicts. The states decide whether prosecutors
can depart from rules of evidence during the
final sentencing phase in capital trials (see note
1), whether judges stand for election, and
whether these elections are partisan. These gov-
ernments also stipulate the list of aggravating
and mitigating factors that juries must consid-
er in the separate sentencing stage of capital
trials.
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5 Bureau of Justice data on all felony convictions
in five death penalty states show that only about 2 of
1,000 offenders received this sentence, but these five
states were more likely to impose this sentence than
other death penalty states. The paucity of death sen-
tences and other data limitations make a general
analysis of the contextual conditions that produce
variation in death sentences impossible with indi-
vidual sentencing data. Because individual data on
the race of victims are unavailable, we can only guess
about the results of an analysis that could take this
factor into account.
Except for lynchings, in the primary analy-
ses we use explanatory variables in 1970, 1980,
and 1990 to explain death sentence counts in
states in 1971–1972, 1981–1982, and
1991–1992. Inclusion of periods separated by
multiple years in a pooled time-series design
substantially reduces serial correlation and the
effects of measurement error (Johnston and
DiNardo 1997). Because the main estimator
we use cannot eliminate serial correlation, we
limit this analysis to these three separated peri-
ods. We begin with 1970 because data on sev-
eral important explanatory variables are not
available before then. In the primary analyses,
death sentences and African American death
sentences in each of these three 2-year sets are
summed to reduce the proportion of states with
no death sentences and to reduce volatility. By
summing death sentences in such large aggre-
gates over three 2-year periods, idiosyncratic
events are less likely to distort the findings.
Although there have been well-publicized
exceptions, death sentences result from an elab-
orate legal process designed to rule out capri-
cious effects (see note 1).6 Because the racial
conflicts based on slavery had little or no effects
on Alaska and Hawaii, and because both states
had idiosyncratic race relations in part because
of their extremely modest black populations,
we eliminate these states, leaving 144 state-
years in the primary analyses.
Tolnay and Beck (1996), however, claimed
that the only available national data on lynch-
ings are inaccurate. These authors painstaking-
ly enumerated lynchings, but they counted these
events in only 10 southern states. To discover
whether the same results persist when the Tolnay
and Beck data are used in place of the counts
of lynchings in all states by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), we provide additional pooled
time-series analyses that assess almost identi-
cal models using yearly contiguous data from
1970 to 1990 from these 10 states. In these
analyses based on these 210 state-years, we can
correct for serial correlation, so this temporal-
ly contiguous data will not threaten the findings.
ESTIMATION. Because death sentences are
infrequent, and because there are important rea-
sons for avoiding rates in analyses of rare events
(Osgood 2000), we use a specialized statistical
procedure designed to estimate unusual occur-
rences (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). Ordinary
Least Squares provides inconsistent estimates
when there are many zero-limit scores in a
count-dependent variable with a modest mean,
but dedicated count estimators are consistent
(Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Long 1997).7 We
estimate all models with negative binomial
instead of a Poisson approach because statisti-
cal tests show that overdispersion is present.
In the 48-state analyses, death sentences may
not occur either because capital punishment
was illegal in a state or because this punishment
was legal, but state trial courts did not impose
death sentences. Yet selection bias might be
present if we confine this analysis only to states
with a legal death penalty. To handle this diffi-
culty, we analyze all 144 state-years, but esti-
mate with a zero-inflated negative binomial
procedure (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Long
1997) that uses two equations. One equation
estimates the factors that produce zero scores
and the other equation detects the factors that
produce one or more death sentences. Zero-
inflated estimation is appropriate if the popu-
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6 The federal courts overturn many death sen-
tences. The state courts that void more death sen-
tences cannot disregard federal rulings, but the federal
courts are not subject to state law, so their decisions
cannot be modeled with state level explanatory vari-
ables. Since 1972, mean state delays from first death
sentence to execution ranged from about 4.5 years
(Nevada) to about 16 years (California, Nebraska).
These delays have lengthened since 1972, so mean
time on death row before execution often exceeds 20
years. In addition to difficulties stipulating appro-
priate lags, other problems make a plausible, purely
state level execution analysis unlikely.
7 The few death sentences mean that this outcome
is best analyzed as a count because rates computed
on rare events are unstable. One historically unique
death sentence in a small state can cause a dramatic
shift from zero to a high rate, so small state variances
often exceed large state variances in rates. These
instabilities produce heteroskedasticity (Osgood
2000). The zero-inflation approach produces more
stable estimates than attempts (not shown) to over-
come selection problems with Heckman procedures.
We use the Stata version 7 “zinb” procedure for zero-
inflated models and this program’s “xtgee nbreg”
procedure to estimate count models.
lation is divided into two subgroups, with one
subgroup never at risk of the outcome at issue
(Cameron and Trivedi 1998:128). The zero cat-
egory of a count-dependent variable should
contain a mix of cases, with some cases at risk
and others not at risk (Cameron and Trivedi
1998). If capital punishment is illegal, offend-
ers cannot be sentenced to death. An absence of
death sentences thus could be attributable to
either a failure to legalize this punishment or a
failure to impose the death sentence although it
is legal. These two reasons for no death sen-
tences fit the mixture condition required for
zero-inflated estimation perfectly.
Additional explanatory variables in statisti-
cal models produce less efficient estimates
(Johnston 1984), and there is no reason to
include the same variables in the primary and
secondary equations of zero-inflated models
(Long and Freese 2001). Adding variables to the
secondary equations that explain zero death
sentences does not enhance explanatory power.
We therefore use parsimonious but empirical-
ly powerful specifications based on findings
about the legality of capital punishment (Jacobs
and Carmichael 2002) in these secondary equa-
tions. We handle the fact that observations from
the same state during these three periods are
unlikely to be independent by correcting the
standard errors for the probable interdependence
between same-state scores over time. This clus-
ter correction produces less efficient but more
robust standard error estimates than those from
a dedicated panel estimator (Rogers 1993).
Zero-inflated models therefore let us retain the
states without the death penalty and avoid selec-
tion bias at the potential cost of marginally larg-
er standard errors, but this cost apparently is
minimal.
In contrast to the 48-state analyses, capital
punishment was legal in the great majority of
state-years in the analysis restricted to the 10
southern states that use the Tolnay and Beck
(1996) lynching counts. It follows that the pro-
portion of state-years with no death sentences
is considerably lower in these analyses than this
proportion in the 48-state analyses. These 10-
state models therefore can be estimated with a
conventional single-equation negative binomi-
al panel approach. We use the population-aver-
aged, random-effects estimator in these analyses
because this approach can correct for serial cor-
relation and heteroskedasticity.
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE MEASUREMENT
One type of minority presence and racial threat
is gauged with both continuous and threshold
measures of the percentage of blacks. Findings
show that a dummy variable threshold measure
of black presence has the greatest explanatory
power when the legality of the death penalty is
at issue (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). Because
it produces the most substantial effects in the
secondary equations that predict the absence
of death sentences, we follow this precedent
and report models with a dummy variable scored
1 if the percentage of blacks in a state is greater
than the state median (6.4 percent). Yet because
black presence is a component of the interaction
term, we use the percentage of blacks in the pri-
mary equations designed to explain death sen-
tence counts. Another form of minority presence
is assessed with the percentage of Hispanics.
In the 48-state analyses, we compute lynch-
ing rates with the NAACP data on state lynch-
ings from 1889 to 1931 divided by mean state
populations in this period. In the analysis of 10
southern states, we use the Tolnay and Beck
(1996) statistics to compute these rates. The
percentage of African Americans and the lynch-
ing rates are mean centered before they are
multiplied to create the interaction term. In
models that gauge interaction effects, the coef-
ficient on a mean-centered main effect repre-
sents this variable’s additive contribution when
the alternative mean-centered main effect is
equal to its mean. If mean centering is not used,
the coefficient on each main effect shows the
additive relationship between that main effect
and the dependent variable when the value of the
alternative main effect is zero. Centering makes
theoretical sense because the racial threat
hypothesis we test suggests that prior lynch-
ings in a state are not likely to produce more
death sentences if there are no current black res-
idents in the state. This procedure is method-
ologically useful as well because it helps to
reduce collinearity between main effects and the
interaction term (Cohen et al. 2003).
Berry et al. (1998) viewed public political ide-
ologies as the mean position on a liberal–con-
servative continuum. They identif ied the
ideological position of each member of
Congress with interest group ratings (Americans
for Democratic Action, Committee on Political
Education) of that representative’s voting record.
They estimated public ideology within each
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congressional district with the ideology score for
the district’s incumbent and an estimated score
for that incumbent’s challenger in the last elec-
tion. Incumbent ideology scores are combined
with estimated challenger ideology scores
weighted by within-district election results to
capture district ideologies. Berry et al. (1998)
calculated state scores on liberalism–conser-
vatism using the mean of these within-state
congressional district scores, with the most lib-
eral states receiving the highest scores.
We assess fundamentalism with a scale cre-
ated by Morgan and Watson (1991) that is based
on the percentage of residents who are members
of fundamentalist churches. This scale is avail-
able only for 1980, but Newport (1979) sug-
gested that church aff iliations in large
aggregates such as states are extremely stable.
We capture the threat attributable to crime with
Uniform Crime Rate violent and property crime
rates, and we control for capital offenses by
entering the number of state murders. We use
crime rates to gauge this menace in states with
different populations. The number of violent
or property crimes would be inappropriate
because the great majority of crimes are not
capital offenses. We use the number of murders
rather than the rates to capture the number of
offenders at risk for the death penalty.8 Judge
selection is measured with a dummy variable
coded 1 for partisan elections using data sup-
plied by Hanssen (2004), and unemployment is
measured with decennial Census rates.
Population and its square are included to adjust
for the likelihood that the number of death sen-
tences will be greater in the most populated
states yet this relationship may not be linear. In
the models that assess the determinants of black
death sentences, we instead use the number of
African Americans and its square. In the primary
analyses, dummy variables for two of the three
periods are included in the models to capture
cross-state trends and regional dummies are
entered to capture otherwise unmeasured factors
such as culture.
The prior discussion suggests that the ideol-
ogy index, which gives liberal states a higher
score, should be inversely related in the equa-
tion that explains multiple death sentences. The
coefficients on all the remaining explanatory
variables should be positive in the first equation
that predicts death sentence counts equal to or
greater than one. The second equation predicts
the probability of a zero score, or the absence
of death sentences (Long 1997:245–46; Long
and Freese 2001), so we expect opposite signs
on the coefficients on theoretically relevant
explanatory variables in this equation. We do
not predict the signs of region, year, or the inter-
cepts, so two-tailed tests are used to assess these
effects. All other relationships are gauged with
one-tailed significance tests.
SPECIFICATION
One of the more general specifications of the
primary zero-inflated negative binomial equa-
tion that models integer counts of one or more
death sentences therefore is as follows:
N death sentences =
b0+ b1(%black  lynch rate) + 
b2lynch rate +
b3%black + b4%black2 + b5ideology + 
b6violent crime rate + (1)
b7property crime rate + b8N murders + 
b9south + b10%unemployed +
b11population + b12population2 + 
b131980 + b141990 + b15%Hispanic + 
b16fundamentalism + b17%unemployed + 
b18partisan judge election,
where N death sentences is one or more death
sentences in a state during the 2 years after each
of the 3 census years.
Because the results show that concise speci-
fications have greater explanatory power than
alternatives, and because there is no statistical
reason to include the same explanatory vari-
ables in the second equation, which predicts
the probability of zero death sentences (Long
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8 Before 1970, the federal courts forbade the death
sentence for rape. With the exception of quite unusu-
al murders, no other violent crimes could result in a
state death sentence during the sample period. Violent
crimes therefore should be in rate rather than count
form. The media focuses on rates, so higher violent
crime rates should accentuate public anxieties.
Substantial violent crime rates should produce greater
media-induced apprehension and heightened public
demands for harsh punishments.
and Freese 2001), these secondary equations
will be parsimonious. One of the more general
specifications of the equation that predicts zero
death sentences therefore is as follows:
death sentence absence = 
b0+ b1%black + b2ideology +
b3republican government + (2)
b4South + b5West + b6Midwest +
b71980 + b81990.
ANALYSES
VARIABLE DISTRIBUTIONS AND A CROSS-
TABULATION
Table 1 shows the expected signs along with the
means and standard deviations both across states
and over time. To give readers an intuitive pic-
ture of the death penalty distribution in cate-
gories of the two most important explanatory
variables, Table 2 shows the mean number of
death sentences cross-classified by the per-
centage of African Americans in the states and
by the number of lynchings. The counts in the
cells on the downward diagonal suggest that
death sentences sharply increase as state scores
on the two primary explanatory variables
become greater. Such contrasts suggest that
death sentence frequencies were greater in states
with the most black residents and lynchings.9
These comparisons also imply that an interac-
tion effect may be present because death sen-
tence counts in the bottom right cell are
substantially larger than their counterparts in
adjacent cells. Of course, these differences may
not persist after other factors are held constant
in more sophisticated analyses, but they suggest
that additional empirical support for the expla-
nations that motivated this inquiry would not be
an artifact of the sophisticated count proce-
dures we use in the main analyses.
ZERO-INFLATED ANALYSES OF 48 STATES
The results from the zero-inflated count mod-
els, which explain all death sentences and death
sentences given to blacks, are presented in Table
3. The first two models show the results when
the total number of death sentences is at issue.
We begin with a restricted model (Model 1). In
Model 2 we add the percentage of Hispanics, the
property crime rates, and the judge election
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Table 1. Variable Means, and Standard Deviations Across States and over Time
X Overall Cross-State Over-Time 
Variable Predicted Sign Mean SD SD SD
Death Sentences (n) 8.410 15.604 12.557 9.382
Black Death Sentences (n) 3.590 6.995 5.586 4.262
Lynch Rate + .046 .066 .066 .000
Black (%) + 9.416 9.269 9.308 .701
Liberalism-Conservatism Index – 44.34 15.65 14.52 6.10
Violent Crime Rate + 417.5 254.6 213.5 141.0
Property Crime Rate + 3,887.7 1678.7 967.9 1376.3
Murders (n) + 425.2 603.4 577.9 186.4
Population + 4.670 4.876 4.840 .822
Black (n) + 53,841 63,130 62,640 10,792
Hispanic (%) + 4.381 7.086 7.030 1.220
Religious Fundamentalism + .216 .228 .230 .000
Unemployed (%) + 5.983 1.641 1.152 1.176
1 if Republican Governor + .444 .499 .294 .404
Note: Data based on 144 state-years; expected signs are opposite in secondary equations that predict zero death
sentences. SD = standard deviation.
9 States with the largest number of death sentences
tend to be in the South. Only Indiana and Missouri
are exceptions. States that have used this sentence
least include northern states such as Connecticut,
the Dakotas, Idaho, Massachusetts, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Vermont, Washington,
and Wyoming.
variable, but the variables included in the sec-
ondary equation that explain the absence of any
death sentences remain unchanged. Models 3
and 4 in Table 3 show what happens when we
use almost identical models to explain death sen-
tences given to African Americans. The only dif-
ference between the right side of these two
models and their prior counterparts that
explained all death sentences is our use of the
number of African Americans and its square
rather than total state populations.
The results based on the first pair of equa-
tions, which together constitute Model 1, show
that the interaction between African American
presence and prior lynchings explains state
propensities to use the death sentence one or
more times. Expectations based on Blalock’s
version of threat theory are supported as well.
The relationship between black presence and
death sentence frequencies departs from lin-
earity (the exact form of these nonlinear inter-
active relationships is explored graphically; see
later in the section on zero-inflated analyses of
48 states).
The findings support another threat hypoth-
esis because they suggest that jurisdictions with
higher violent crime rates are more likely to
use this sentence after the number of murders
has been held constant. Fundamentalist church
memberships also have positive effects in this
analysis of all death sentences. The results for
the second equation in Model 1, which predicts
zero death sentences, support prior findings
about the legality of this punishment (Jacobs and
Carmichael 2002). They show that jurisdictions
with black populations larger than the state
median are more likely to use this sentence at
least once. The results in Model 2 are almost
identical to those reported in Model 1. Both
models suggest that the joint effects of lynch-
ings and black threat lead to additional death
sentences, a finding that supports the primary
theoretical supposition that prompted this
research.
Models 3 and 4 depict the results when black
death sentences are analyzed. To capture the
population at risk of these death sentences, the
number of African Americans replaces the total
population in Models 3 and 4, but that substi-
tution and the dependent variable are the only
differences between Models 1 and 2 and Models
3 and 4. As might be expected, because the
dependent variable is restricted to African
American death sentences, the nonlinear rela-
tionship between the percentage of African
Americans and death sentences now is stronger
and has more consistent effects in these analy-
ses.10 In contrast to the results when all death
sentences were at issue, the unemployment rates
explain black death sentences, but there is no
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Table 2. Mean Number of Death Sentences Cross-Classified by Percentage of Blacks and by Number of
Lynchings in 48 States
Lynchings
Percentage of Blacks Few Intermediate High Row Totals
Low .04 4.76 1.00 1.82
(24) (17) (9) (50)
Intermediate 5.88 12.16 9.00 9.23
(16) (19) (9) (44)
High .63 11.07 20.11 14.28
(8) (15) (27) (50)
—Column Totals 2.08 9.37 14.07
(48) (51) (45)
Note: Analysis based on 144 state-years; state-year cell counts are in parentheses.
p ≤ .0001 (ANOVA F-test = 6.59).
10 In part because these relationships are both non-
linear and interactive, the important factor is the
degree to which both nonlinear terms are jointly sig-
nificant. These paired terms are significant in Models
3 and 4 in Table 4. The point where the relationship
between the percentage of blacks and death sen-
tences shifts from positive to negative cannot be
determined with the formula that is appropriate for
noninteractive quadratic relationships. Instead, this
nonlinear relationship and its dependence on lynch-
ing rate values will be illustrated graphically.
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Table 3. Number of Death Sentences in the States in 1971–1972, 1981–1982, and 1991–1992
All Death Sentences Black Death Sentences
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
1 or more Death Sentences
—Lynch rate x Percent Black .367* .352* .969* .989*
— (.159) (.169) (.449) (.477)
—Lynch rate (centered) –2.439 –1.949 –6.834 –6.933
— (1.766) (1.880) (4.413) (4.493)
—Percent Black (centered) –.012 .009 .014 .028
— (.032) (.052) (.048) (.057)
—Percent Black2 (centered) –.002 –.003 –.007** –.008**
— (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003)
—Liberal-Conservative Index –.013 –.010 –.011 –.010
— (.011) (.012) (.009) (.011)
—Number of Murders –.000 –.000 .000 .000
— (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
—1 if South .080 –.055 .277 .210
— (.305) (.469) (.447) (.480)
—Population or Number of Blacks/103 .232*** .229*** .002** .002**
— (.041) (.047) (.001) (.001)
—Population2 or Number of Blacks2/108 –.445*** –.428*** –.009** –.009**
— (.107) (.105) (.004) (.003)
—1 if 1980 1.049** .944* .532 .386
— (.370) (.482) (.341) (.525)
—1 if 1990 .861** .791 .399 .279
— (.349) (.415) (.439) (.583)
—Religious fundamentalism 1.914** 2.162* .984 1.185
— (.805) (1.145) (.722) (.881)
—Percent Unemployed .105 .105 .161* .177*
— (.086) (.100) (.093) (.101)
—Violent crime rate .002** .001* .002* .002*
— (.001) (.000) (.001) (.001)
—Property crime rate .— .000 .— .000
— (.000) (.000)
—Percent Hispanic .— .008 .— .006
— (.036) (.028)
—1 if Partisan judge elections .— –.169 .— –.180
— (.388) (.412)
——Intercept –1.064 –1.087* –1.883* –1.933*
— (.584) (.521) (.934) (.969)
Death Sentence Absence
—1 if Percent Black ≥ median –3.354*** –3.313*** –4.333* –4.238*
— (1.053) (1.094) (1.873) (1.923)
—Liberal-Conservative Index .117 .128 .184* .186*
— (.151) (.196) (.089) (.087)
—1 if Republican Governor –1.323 –1.436 –2.482* –2.507*
— (1.265) (1.959) (1.297) (1.191)
—1 if South –2.250 –2.333 –2.541 –2.690
— (1.288) (1.336) (1.588) (1.644)
—1 if West –3.292 –3.361 –.921 –.880
— (2.371) (2.990) (2.115) (2.057)
—1 if Midwest .138 .335 2.111 2.135
— (2.708) (3.701) (2.264) (2.107)
—1 if 1980 .651 .854 1.162 1.176
— (2.552) (3.937) (1.226) (1.059)
—1 if 1990 –.748 –.629 –.624 –.663
— (1.895) (2.479) (1.314) (1.241)
——Intercept –2.959 –3.751 –6.377 –6.568
— (9.969) (13.457) (4.854) (4.541)
——Log likelihood –293.8 –293.3 –208.7 –208.4
Note: Data shown are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Zero-inflated negative binomial estimates
of the number of black death sentences. Analysis based of 144 state-years; within state cluster corrected standard
errors.
a Total state population is entered in Models 1 and 2; the Black population is entered in Models 3 and 4.
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 (one-tailed tests except for intercepts, region, and years).
evidence that religious fundamentalism leads to
additional death sentences for blacks.
The only other findings that depart from
those in the first two models appear in the sec-
ondary equations, which predict the complete
absence of black death sentences. These results
suggest that political effects matter in these
restricted analyses, because the findings suggest
that a complete absence of black death sen-
tences is unlikely in states with a Republican
governor and those in which conservative views
are dominant.11
To give the reader an intuitive picture of these
combined nonlinear and interactive effects,
Figure 1 graphs the predicted number of African
American death sentences based on the coeffi-
cient on the interaction term and the coeffi-
cients on the quadratic terms that assess the
nonlinear relationship between the percentage
of blacks and the number of black death sen-
tences using point estimates from Model 4 in
Table 3. Because these associations are inter-
active, the relationship between African
American presence and the number of their
death sentences should differ depending on
lynching rate values. To illustrate these condi-
tional contrasts, we graph two relationships.
The f irst shows the predicted association
between the percentage of blacks and black
death sentences, with lynching rates equal to the
25th percentile (this relationship is horizontal-
ly truncated because of limits on the percentage
of blacks in states with so few lynchings). The
second to the right of the first relationship shows
this nonlinear association in jurisdictions with
lynching rates at the 95th percentile.
As shown earlier, predictions derived from
theories at issue suggest that in states with high
lynching rates, it should take a far larger African
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Figure 1. Relationships between the Percentage of Blacks and Predicted Death Sentences When Lynchings Are
at the 25th Percentile and When Lynchings are at the 95th Percentile
Note: Vertical line denotes the median percentage of blacks in the 48 states.
11 The statistical significance of the interaction
term is not sensitive to the removal of additional
explanatory variables in these models. For example,
elimination of the squared term that captures the
population at risk of a death sentence or the funda-
mentalism measure does not alter these results.
Models that include a dummy coded 1 if the death
penalty is legal in the secondary equations that pre-
dict the absence of death sentences are too collinear
to be estimated.
American presence before the number of death
sentences begins to fall as a consequence of
increased black populations. This is so because
the threat attributable to larger black populations
should be more menacing to whites in these
jurisdictions. Hence, white resistance to black
political influence should be greater in such
states. Figure 1 implies that this expectation is
correct because the inflection point at which the
relationship between the percentage of African
Americans and the number of African American
death sentences shifts from positive to negative
materializes only after the percentage of African
Americans exceeds 20 percent in the states with
a high lynching rate (the vertical line denotes the
median percentage of blacks to highlight these
differences in the location of inflection points
on the horizontal axis). The contrasts in this
graph are revealing because they clearly show
how racial threat had a stronger influence on
African American death sentences in states in
which vigilante violence, largely directed
against this racial minority, was most pro-
nounced.12
ANALYSES OF 10 SOUTHERN STATES
Yet it is possible that the 48-state results are
biased by measurement error in the NAACP
lynching data (Tolnay and Beck 1996). The
only available alternative counts were enumer-
ated by Tolnay and Beck, but these counts are
restricted to lynchings in 10 southern states.13
We nevertheless can check the prior findings
with models computed on this 10-state lynch-
ing data, but we must include all state-years
between 1970 and 1990 to provide sufficient
cases. We now estimate with a panel-corrected
negative binomial rather than a zero-inflation
approach. Zero death sentences occurred in
only a few state-years in this sample largely
because this penalty almost always was legal in
these states. It follows that zero-inflated esti-
mation is unnecessary in these models, and
Vuong test results support this conclusion. Yet
because we must use contiguous years, serial
correlation may be problematic. To correct this
problem, we estimate with a population-aver-
aged, random-effects approach.
Table 4 presents two models. The first ana-
lyzes all death sentences, and the second assess-
es the determinants of the number of African
American death sentences. Because this sample
is restricted to a region in which racial effects
should differ from those in the 48-state analy-
ses, some model respecifications are appropri-
ate. In these 10-state analyses, we test a few
additional quadratic relationships because the
influence of threat effects based on higher vio-
lent crime rates, murders, and the presence of
another minority (Hispanics) should be stronger
in states that have such an idiosyncratic histo-
ry of violent racial conflicts.
It is noteworthy that the two 10-state analy-
ses reported in Table 4 support the prior find-
ings based on the NAACP lynching counts. The
only contrasts between these 10-state results
and those based on 48 states concern a few
additional departures from linearity. As expect-
ed from threat theory, after the number of mur-
ders and the percentage of Hispanics reach
modest thresholds in these southern states, the
relationships between such threats and death
sentences become increasingly positive. But
the main implication of these new models is that
results based on different lynching counts and
a different sample support the 48-state find-
ings. The interaction between current black
presence and past vigilante violence explains
death sentence frequencies in both the 48-state
and the 10-state analyses. We can conclude
from this exercise that the 48-state findings
probably cannot be attributed to measurement
error in the NAACP lynching data.
ADDITIONAL TESTS. The zero-inflated models
reported in Table 3 always pass the Vuong test,
so this zero-inflation procedure is more appro-
priate than single-equation count estimators
would be in the 48-state analyses. Additional
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12 Because the other explanatory variables are not
held at their means, the vertical placement of the
two relationships shown in Figure 1 is arbitrary, but
the contrasts between the two estimated relation-
ships depicted in this graph are meaningful. The hor-
izontal differences in inflection point placement
across the x axis and the vertical differences in the
location of these two inflection points on the y axis
reflect estimated relationships based on the data.
Attempts to find nonlinear relationships between
lynchings and death sentences were unsuccessful.
13 The 10 states included in these analyses because
alternative Tolnay and Beck (1996) counts of lynch-
ings are available are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
Table 4. Number of All Death Sentences and Number of Black Death Sentences in Ten Southern States from
1970 to 1990
All Death Sentences Black Death Sentences
Lynch Rate  Percent Black .489* (.229) .618** (.260)
Lynch Rate (centered) –.248 (1.935) –2.493 (2.441)
Percent Black (centered) .010 (.014) –.022 (.034)
Percent Black2 (centered) –.003* (.001) –.002 (.002)
Liberal-Conservative Index –.018* (.008) –.040*** (.011)
Violent Crime Rate .010*** (.003) .012*** (.003)
Violent Crime Rate2/105 –.853*** (.225) –.917*** (.213)
Property Crime Rate .000 (.000) .000 (.000)
Number of Murders –.004* (.002) –.004* (.002)
Number of Murders2/105 .216** (.089) .247** (.104)
Percent Hispanic –.546*** (.103) –.384** (.165)
Percent Hispanic2 .048*** (.015) .057*** (.015)
Percent Unemployed .155*** (.020) .149*** (.022)
Population/106 .429*** (.131) .— .—
Number of Blacks/106 .— .— .015* (.007)
—Intercept –2.422*** (.560) –2.126** (.728)
Note: Data shown are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Random-effects negative binomial esti-
mates of the number of all death sentences and the number of Black death sentences. Analyses use the Tolnay and
Beck Lynching Data (210 state-years; standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation).
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (one-tailed tests except for intercepts).
models (not shown) indicate that the same
explanatory variables are influential after we
remove the four state-years with the most death
sentences. Such results suggest that the findings
probably cannot be attributed to the influence
of a few states with the highest death sentence
counts. In other models (not shown), we find
that economic indicators such as economic
inequality, the poverty rate, and black–white
income or unemployment ratios have no effects.
If we instead use the percentage of blacks rather
than a dummy variable when we assess the
probability of no death sentences, the findings
persist, but explanatory power is reduced.
Hypotheses that threat measures work through
partisanship or ideology to affect the number of
death sentences are not supported.14 Additional
statistical interactions do not explain death sen-
tences, and attempts to use dummies to capture
other threshold effects were equally unsuc-
cessful.
The contrasts in death sentences when this
outcome is cross-classified with black presence
and lynchings plus the persistence of these
results after we use diverse specifications, dif-
ferent samples, and different estimators imply
that these findings represent the most important
underlying processes determining death sen-
tence frequencies. These results always suggest
that states with the largest black populations
and the most substantial inclinations to use vig-
ilante violence in the past now are more likely
to impose the death penalty.15
CONCLUSIONS
RESULTS
We find consistent support for the primary the-
oretical suppositions that prompted this analy-
sis. If current death sentence frequencies are
attributable in part to the combination of prior
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14 The conventional way to detect indirect effects
involves path analysis, but this procedure is inap-
propriate in zero-inflated count analyses. A more
defensible approach involves removing explanatory
variables, but the results do not support hypotheses
that some explanatory variables work through others
to influence the number of death sentences.
15 There is strong evidence that collinearity is not
distorting the results. The primary difficulty imposed
by collinearity is unstable coefficients. Yet the mul-
tivariate findings remain stable despite substantial
changes in the specifications.
illegal violence directed largely against blacks
and the current racial threat based on the size
of contemporary African American populations,
an interaction term that assesses the joint effects
of current racial threat and past vigilantism
should have a positive relationship with recent
death sentences. Our repeated findings that this
relationship is present support claims that a
prior tradition of lethal vigilantism enhances
recent attempts to use the death penalty as long
as the threat posed by current black popula-
tions is sufficient to trigger this legal but lethal
control mechanism (Dollard 1957; Phillips
1987; Turk 1982).
The findings from secondary equations that
predict zero death sentences show that states
with percentages of blacks above a threshold are
more likely to use the death sentence at least
once. These results are based in part on a primary
reason for the absence of this sentence. There can
be no death sentences in states that do not have
a legal death penalty. Past research finds that the
death sentence is likely to be legal in states when
the percentage of blacks is greater than the same
threshold (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). The
current results support this finding by showing
that an identical threshold has greater explana-
tory power than its continuous alternative when
the complete absence of death sentences is at
issue. Capital punishment, however, was legal in
some states that never used the death sentence,
so these secondary equations that predict zero
death sentences capture both effects.
We find inconsistent support for the alterna-
tive minority threat hypothesis. Evidence that
Hispanic threat matters can be found only in the
southern state analyses. Such contrasting find-
ings about the explanatory power of racial rather
than Hispanic threat should not be surprising in
light of the exceptionally divisive and violent
conflicts about race throughout U.S. history
(Myrdal 1944; Tocqueville [1835] 1948), which
should give racial threat greater explanatory
power than its Hispanic alternative. Yet because
only a few states had substantial Hispanic pop-
ulations before 1991, this ethnic group may not
have been sufficiently large in enough states to
trigger repressive responses. Subsequent stud-
ies therefore may support this ethnic threat
account because the Hispanic population has
expanded rapidly since 1990.
The interaction between prior lynchings and
black threat that predicted all death sentences
offers modest support for a hypothesis that
whites and blacks are more likely to receive
this sentence in states with a vigilante tradi-
tion. Yet, as expected, the coefficients on this
interaction term were stronger when the analy-
ses were restricted to black death sentences.
The findings in the models that analyze all
death sentences nevertheless offer limited sup-
port for a supposition that past vigilantism leads
to a legal system that makes the death penalty
more likely for all offenders, even if this sanc-
tion is primarily designed to control black street
criminals. One possible explanation for such
findings concerns the need to avoid conspicu-
ous discrimination in the death sentencing
process. Frequent discrimination in this legal
process that is undeniable would threaten the
constitutionality of capital punishment.
Unwarranted racial influences on this legal
process probably must be subtle and difficult to
detect if a legal death penalty is to be preserved.
Although the evidence for this explanation for
white death sentences could be more defini-
tive, it is not contradicted by the inconsistent
findings reported in the many studies on the
effects of offender race on trial court decisions
about the death sentence.
In light of Republican admissions that their
law and order campaign appeals were designed
to capture white votes (Beckett 1997), it is inter-
esting that Republican control of the governor’s
office helps to explain the presence of at least
one black death sentence, although Republican
control of this office does not explain the total
number of death sentences. As many political
and social theorists (Garland 1990; Lacey 1988)
would expect, we also find relationships between
the strength of liberal political convictions and
the complete absence of black death sentences.
Both political findings are consistent with evi-
dence about the legality of this punishment
because past research has found that ideologi-
cally liberal states with weaker Republican par-
ties were less likely to have a legal death penalty
(Jacobs and Carmichael 2002).
Religious views account for all death sen-
tences, but they do not explain the number of
African American death sentences. These results
nevertheless imply that prior findings about the
relationship between fundamentalism and puni-
tive views are not restricted to attitudes
(Grasmick and McGill 1994; Grasmick et al.
1992). These links between fundamentalism
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and public support for harsh punishments also
help to explain the imposition of the most severe
sentence. Such findings about the links between
political and religious conservatism and the
greater use of the death sentence provide added
support for theoretical claims about the effects
of public values (Garland 1990, 2001;
Savelsberg 1994; Windlesham 1998), particu-
larly in a direct democracy such as the United
States, when the most severe criminal sanction
is decided.
Other threat findings are noteworthy. After the
number of capital offenses and many addition-
al factors have been held constant, we always
find that jurisdictions with the highest violent
crime rates are likely to sentence capital offend-
ers to death. Such results are supported by find-
ings showing that a positive relationship exists
between violent crime rates and public support
for the death penalty (Rankin 1979). Yet our
results go further because they suggest that the
menace produced by non-capital violent offens-
es also leads to a greater use of the death sen-
tence. But the primary theoretical implication
concerns repeated finding that states with larg-
er black populations and a history of violent
repression directed largely against this racial
minority still are likely to use a deadly legal pun-
ishment against this racial minority.
WIDER IMPLICATIONS
Analyses based on aggregate data can detect
hidden associations. This study shows that lethal
vigilantism in the past and current threats attrib-
utable to larger black populations operate in
concert to increase death sentences, but an
analysis confined to individual offenders could
not uncover these relationships. There are other
reasons for using a contextual approach.
First, it is unlikely that the court officials or
the jurors who decide the death sentence can
ignore their social environment. Students of the
courts claim that contextual factors in court
environments should be given greater attention
(Carp and Stidham 1996; Hughes 1995; Jacob
1995). Second, sentencing studies often treat the
courts as organizations because external influ-
ences on the courts matter. The organizational
literature stresses external effects. In contrast to
internal factors, environmental accounts have
provided far more powerful explanations for
organizational behavior. Although most research
on criminal sentencing has focused on the race
of individual offenders, findings about this con-
troversial issue remain mixed (Chiricos and
Crawford 1995; Walker, Spohn, and DeLone
1996; Zatz 1987) and sharply debated, in part
because almost all of the many offender level
studies analyzing sentencing have assessed this
outcome in one or only a few jurisdictions. This
study overcomes problems with potentially
unrepresentative samples by analyzing the envi-
ronmental determinants of death sentences over
a long period in all state trial courts.
If we compare our results with those from the
study investigating the legality of capital pun-
ishment (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002), the pre-
vious findings show that economic inequality
explained whether the death penalty was legal,
but that unemployment did not. This pattern is
reversed when black death sentences are ana-
lyzed. High joblessness rates account for these
death sentences, but inequality does not explain
either black or all death sentences. Such unem-
ployment results are consistent with a supposi-
tion that joblessness leads to mass resentments
against underclass capital offenders, but this
explanation requires additional support before
it can be accepted. The results in this study
show that religious fundamentalism leads to
increased death sentences, but this factor had no
effect on the legality of this punishment in the
prior investigation. The political factors that
explain the legality of capital punishment also
explain the absence of black death sentences in
this study. More generally, these findings extend
the political perspective on punishment because
they show that political factors explain an entire-
ly different set of death penalty outcomes.
This research supports the new political
approach in other ways. In theoretical presen-
tations Garland (2001), Savelsberg (1994), and
Whitman (2003) provide historical accounts
showing how public values shaped criminal
punishment. As compared with European soci-
eties, political values should have stronger
effects on legal sanctions in the United States
because of the populistic nature of this most
direct of all large democracies. It is not to be
expected that mass values will be as influential
in Europe, where social policy is decided large-
ly by unelected bureaucrats (Savelsberg 1994;
Whitman 2003). These considerations suggest
that our findings about political values might not
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hold elsewhere. Results showing that religious
and political convictions expressed through acts
such as church membership or voting help to
explain U.S. death sentences nevertheless
enhance the plausibility of a comparative polit-
ical approach to criminal punishment.
Other cautions are in order. The theoretical-
ly interesting findings in this study are sugges-
tive, but they are not definitive. As Tolnay and
Beck (1996:238) noted in their careful analysis
of the determinants of lynchings, although their
(and our) models were specified with the best
available theory and research findings consid-
ered, model specification in sociology and other
nonexperimental disciplines cannot be deter-
mined completely by our sometimes less than
precise theories. Yet the almost identical results
that appeared when we analyzed different sam-
ples and dependent variables with different esti-
mation procedures enhance our confidence in
the accuracy of these results. We nevertheless
hope that this study will encourage additional
efforts to detect links between forms of racial
repression and the death penalty.
The relationships between prior lynchings
and recent death sentences that we have isolat-
ed also suggest that vivid historical events con-
tinue to influence the current behavior of
important social institutions. The finding that
acts in the distant past still affect recent legal
decisions about who will live and who will die
suggests that research that fails to take histori-
cal events explicitly into account can produce
misleading results. In this instance, results doc-
umenting the enduring effects of past racial
violence support assertions (Poveda 2000) that
the 19th century racial caste system and the
violent means used to preserve it help to explain
why the United States has adopted such an
exceptional stance on the death penalty, as com-
pared with the many equivalent democracies
that have so emphatically renounced this pun-
ishment.16
The most important implication of these find-
ings concerns racial equity. Repeated results
showing that a relationship exists between race
and the death penalty are significant because this
irreversible sanction should be imposed with-
out racial bias. Yet it is deeply ironic that the only
advanced democracy that continues to use the
death penalty so often has such an exceptional
history of bitter racial conflict (Myrdal 1944).
Findings indicating that the past violence used
primarily to repress newly freed slaves still con-
tributes to recent death sentences as long as
enough African Americans are present do not
suggest that the death penalty is currently
imposed in a color-blind fashion. If the legal
process that produces executions truly were
color-blind, this horrific vigilantism should not
have such persistent effects. Instead, the his-
torically contingent link that we have detected
between recent death sentences and violent
repression in the past suggests that both lynch-
ings and current death sentences were and are
now partly used for the same repressive ends.
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16 In contrast to other affluent democracies, only
Japan and the United States still use the death penal-
ty. Japan executes fewer than six offenders per year,
but U.S. yearly executions have exceeded 21 since
1983. After the 1976 relegalization, mean yearly U.S.
executions equaled 28.5 from 1977 to 2000, and the
largest number was 98, in 1999. Claims that the
United States is exceptional in its use of this penal-
ty (Poveda 2000; Zimring and Hawkins 1986) there-
fore are difficult to dispute. As Poveda pointed out,
U.S. execution frequencies are equivalent to those in
authoritarian states such as China or Iran.
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of capital punishment in the United States and cross-
national shifts in the legalization of the death penalty.
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